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Abstract  
 
Moral reasoning based on deontology frames much of the debate in the scholarly 
literature and the journalism texts about ethics in journalism. Yet when the ethics of 
journalists and editors are called into question, a variety of forms of moral reasoning 
seem to appear. This article is a case study of the various forms of moral reasoning that 
were applied in the public debate which followed publication on May 8, 2002, in The 
Australian newspaper, of a full colour, front page photograph of assassinated Dutch 
politician Pym Fortuyn lying dead and uncovered at the crime scene with the 
accompanying headline: Death of a gay, anti-Muslim maverick. Specifically, this 
article canvasses the relationship between taste and ethics, the limits of deontological 
arguments and codes, and the use of casuistry by the newspaper’s editor in defending 
publication of the photograph. 
 
What did Pym Fortuyn represent? 
 
Dutch politician Pym Fortuyn was assassinated at Hilversum, 16 km south of 
Amsterdam on May 7, 2002. The following day, The Australian, the News Ltd national 
daily broadsheet newspaper in Australia, published a full colour, front-page photograph 
of the assassinated politician lying dead in the radio station car park. It was the only 
major Australian newspaper to publish this photograph on the front page, and in colour, 
and one of the few quality newspapers around the world to do so. Readers complained. 
The paper received more than fifty emails of complaint, and at least three formal 
complaints were lodged with the Australian Press Council (Dodd, 2002, p.7). 
 
Fortuyn attracted increasing international media attention following the first 
round of the French presidential elections in April 2002 which saw the perennial right 
wing candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen secure more votes than incumbent socialist Prime 
Minister Leon Jospin. Fortuyn’s party, Pym’s List, was the latest in a line of neo-rightist 
parties in Europe which included Italy's Northern League, Jorg Haider's Austrian 
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Freedom Party and the Danish People's Party. In a world in which the free movement of 
goods and services across national boundaries is promoted as one of the highest forms of 
public good, but the free movement of people is not, Fortuyn sought to capture the votes 
of those anxious and insecure about increased people flows from the third world. This is 
how he was profiled in The Times (London) a month before his assassination: 
 
A flamboyant, homosexual academic with a shaven head and taste for 
luxury emerged as Europe's newest anti-establishment, anti-immigrant 
scourge yesterday after his fledgling organisation routed the main parties 
in Rotterdam's municipal elections. … in a country that prides itself on its 
tolerance, political correctness and multiculturalism… Mr Fortuyn, 54, is 
an author, television personality and former sociology professor who 
employs a butler, dresses foppishly and travels in a black, chauffeur-
driven Daimler with his two small dogs... (Fletcher, 2002). 
 
A month later, Fortuyn was dead. Case studies of controversial death photographs 
are not new (Wischmann, 1987; Parsons & Smith, 1988; O’Brien, 1993). What 
distinguishes this study is the attempt to translate the public discussion about such 
photographs - and in particular the editor’s defence of his decision to publish - into the 
language of ethical theory in the hope of seeing more clearly the nature of the moral 
reasoning applied. While much of the work on the nature of moral understanding and 
ethical decision-making by Lawrence Kohlberg and others focuses on what people say 
they would do (Kohlberg, 1984)), case studies such as this examine what actually 
occurred. Krebs et al. (1997, p.132) have drawn attention to ‘real life’ moral reasoning, as 
distinct from the Kohlbergian approach to moral understanding with its focus on the most 
just solution to moral dilemmas. Krebs et al. find that “…people adapt the structure of 
their moral reasoning to their audiences,” (Krebs, 1997, p.134). This case study attempts 
to find such ‘real life’ moral reasoning at work. 
 
The picture and its headline(s) 
 
Rupert Murdoch’s News Ltd owns The Australian, a quality broadsheet.  Readers 
expressed surprise and disgust at finding such a confronting photograph in a publication 
which has devoted – in its own way - considerable space to public journalism, and which, 
since its establishment in 1964, has been repeatedly cited as a symbol of Murdoch’s 
commitment to quality journalism, a shining light amid the sea of tits and bums on which 
the Murdoch empire floated for so long (Schultz, 1998, p.177; Shawcross, 1993, p. 115, 
p. 121, p.144). 
 
At the outset, The Australian’s editors recognised the controversial nature of the 
photograph, or perhaps more exactly, the headlines that ran above it. In the early editions 
of the paper Death of a gay, anti-Muslim maverick was the headline. In later editions 
this was changed to: Killing of far-Right hero rocks Europe.  Such was reader reaction 
to the photograph that Editor Michael Stutchbury took the unusual steps of appearing on 
ABC morning radio to defend the publication of the photograph, and, the following day 
of publishing an explanation, not an apology, acknowledging under a headline reading: 
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From The Editor that “Many readers were taken aback by our page one photograph 
yesterday…” (Stutchbury, 2002, p.2). In neither an extended interview with presenter 
Susan Mitchell on ABC Radio, nor in his mea culpa the following day, did Stutchbury 
acknowledge the change of headline. 
 
Confusing taste and ethics 
 
Published material can be both ethical and in good taste and it can be both 
unethical and in bad taste. It may also be unethical, yet in good taste (naughty but nice). 
Finally, published material can be highly ethical in its content, yet lacking in good taste. 
The suggestion that published material can be highly ethical in its content, yet lacking in 
good taste is supported by some of the material used in social marketing campaigns. The 
Grim Reaper television advertisements used to raise public awareness of HIV- Aids were 
considered by many to be in poor taste, but it was this very lack of taste – and the shock 
factor associated with that lack of taste - which contributed to the heightening of public 
awareness of the issue (Tulloch, 1989; Lupton, 1991, pp.71-72). Similarly, anti-smoking 
campaigns, which show the amount of fat in the aorta and tar in the liver of smokers, are 
hardly the epitome of good taste. From the deontological perspective of government 
health authorities performing their duty to inform the public, and from a consequentialist 
perspective, with respect to the outcomes achieved by such campaigns, such social 
marketing programs can be said to be ethical but hardly tasteful (Hafstad et al., 1997; 
Montazeri & McEwen, 1997; Hafstad et al., 1996). 
 
Questions of ethics and taste are often confused in the public mind when 
controversial visual subject matter – either advertising or editorial – is published. There is 
an extensive literature on the notion of taste, most of it to do with art and aesthetics 
(Cornford, 1968) and very little of it concerned with what constitutes bad taste in 
journalism and advertising. Taste deals with the perception, discernment and judgement 
of an object and the extent to which it evokes sensations, and then judgements, of 
pleasure or displeasure. If the sensation and judgement are disposed towards pleasure, 
then the object is in good taste, and bad taste if the sensation and judgement incline 
towards displeasure. 
 
Since the eighteenth century, ethical judgement and aesthetic judgement – that is 
judgements about taste - have been held to be separate. Kant, while applying the principle 
of universalisability to both ethics and aesthetics, argued that good and bad taste could be 
determined, as Shusterman (1989, p.211) put it, “by appeal to notions of natural 
uniformity of feeling based universal human nature…” 
 
According to one of the more prolific contemporary writers on taste, Theodore 
Gracyk (1990, p.159), the Kantian view of taste is that: “Judgments of taste involve a 
sequence of judgments, in which feeling provides the non-conceptual aesthetic judgment 
concerning the representation of the object, followed by a conceptually determinate 
judgment concerning the empirical object”. Gracyk explains the apparent paradox in 
Kant’s position by saying that “Kant asserts both that feeling is the basis of aesthetic 
judgment and that judgment is the basis of feeling” (p.159. My emphases).  
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There have been a number of attempts to resolve this central paradox in Kant’s 
thinking. Some have argued for more subtlety (Zangwell, 1988), others have dismissed 
both Kant and Hume as imposing class and hierarchy as universal standards (Shusterman, 
1989). Nevertheless, the Kantian paradox does focus attention on the relationship 
between sentiments and formal judgments in both ethics and aesthetics. One approach to 
morality has been to attempt to systematize moral intuitions or feelings. That is to say, if 
human beings tend generally to experience repugnance at certain acts, a moral rule may 
be derived from this, which then becomes prescriptive. Thus, there is a movement from 
the descriptive (moral sentiments) to the prescriptive or normative (moral rules). These 
moral rules, when internalised, come to influence sentiments. So the process is circular, 
but not viciously so. This was the essential proposition of the British tradition of moral 
reasoning of which David Hume was part. Hume (1975, p.170) observed: 
 
There has been a controversy started of late, much better worth 
examination, concerning the general foundation of MORALS; whether 
they be derived from REASON, or from SENTIMENT; whether we attain 
the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an 
immediate feeling and finer internal. 
 
So when readers accuse a newspaper of publishing an item which is in ‘bad taste’ 
are they making an aesthetic judgement, or an ethical one? Is the argument that the 
offending item is ‘wrong’ and ‘ought not’ be published, or that it departs from the 
aesthetic standards which are universally held to be good, the traditional Kantian 
approach to aesthetics which, in the absence of a viable post-modern theory of taste and 
aesthetics, still holds sway.   
 
In the case of the Fortuyn photograph, it depends on whether the offence created 
by publication arises from any genuine moral sentiment, or from some false sense or 
notion of ‘taste’. It is more likely that this offence does have some genuine basis in moral 
principle arising out of respect for persons, including respect for the dead rather than 
being a 'mere' judgement of taste. This is the deontological locus of the issue. However, 
there is the additional consequentialist consideration, that inasmuch as the publication 
was sufficiently tasteless so as to cause caused offence, it was immoral or unethical 
anyway, simply on account of its consequences. So examining whether there were any 
moral grounds for the offence provides the link between the two approaches. If so, then 
the deontological analysis can prevail as well, and publication of the photograph is 
damned on both accounts. 
 
Thus, an act of bad taste, inasmuch as its causes offence, can be immoral. For 
example, to tell a joke which is in 'bad taste' becomes an immoral act precisely because it 
offends people, by being racist, sexist, or in some other way offensive. It is the 
immorality which is primary, and which is what makes the telling of the joke to be 'in bad 
taste'. Publication of the Fortuyn photograph clearly caused offence. It did so not because 
it was in bad taste as such, that is to say poorly composed, or ugly. Indeed Stutchbury 
praised its composition. Rather the photograph outraged people's sense of respect for 
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persons (or perhaps for some other reason), though these may not have been consciously 
articulated at the time. It was the causing of moral offence, which placed the act in the 
category of 'bad taste'. On this account, the issue is not to do with aesthetic judgments at 
all, but fundamental moral principles, and the resort to the issue of 'taste' disguises this. 
This resort to the category of  'bad taste' may be because of individuals' inability 
adequately to formulate the grounds of moral offence.  
 
This difficulty about distinguishing between ethics and aesthetics, between the 
‘good’ and the ‘beautiful’, separated since the Enlightenment, and implicit in reader 
complaints about the Fortuyn photograph, might be solved if we were to consider ‘taste’ 
as a moral virtue in the Aristotelian sense, as an acquired habit, an excellence of 
character, the middle way between an excess and a deficit. As Aristotle (1955, p.107) put 
it, “…Moral virtue is a mean…a mean between two vices, one of excess and the other of 
deficiency …and…it aims at hitting the mean point in feelings and actions”. What those 
excesses and deficits might be is the challenging question. Might excesses of good taste 
be found in kitsch and sentimentality, in themselves bad taste (Solomon, 1991; 
Feibleman, 1971)?  And might deficits of taste be those things that create feelings of 
revulsion and disgust, lacking in balance, respect, and even integrity?  
 
Consequentialism masquerading as deontology? 
 
Despite the revitalisation of virtue ethics over the past two decades, journalism 
and media ethics has not engaged substantially with the MacIntyrean project, while fields 
such as diverse as psychology, political philosophy, and medical ethics and animal ethics 
have (Statman 1997, p.25). Much of the scholarly discussion about journalism ethics over 
this same period has continued to be framed principally in deontological terms (Hafez, 
2002; Elsaka, 2001; Cohen & Elliott, 1997; Merrill, 1997; Borden, 1997; Cronin & 
McPherson, 1995; Johannesen, 1987; Skaggs, 1985; Elliott-Boyle, 1985; Christians, 
1985; Bukro, 1985). Little appears to have changed since Mills found in 1983, (p.592) 
that “the dominant motif …was a concern was for a tough professional code of ethics”. 
Even when scholars such as Black (1979) and Elliott (1991) argue for the application of 
moral development theory to the study of ethics in journalism, the discussion is focused 
on Kohlberg, whose framework, to the extent that it can be said to have any basis in 
ethical theory, is best described as Kantian (Crittenden, p.173). Others such as Meyers 
(1990), for example, merely quote Aristotle, note MacIntyre (p.26), and revert to a 
discussion about the principle of privacy. Lambeth (1990) is one of the few scholars to 
engage with virtue ethics. His account of how Macintyre’s neo-Aristotelian ethic might 
be applied to journalism seemed to have been greeted with a resounding silence by media 
scholars 
 
In Australia, the focus on deontology seems to be particularly the case, with 
almost all the literature on ethics in journalism focused on codes, (Richards, 1998; 
Josephi, 1998; Hirst, 1997; Borden, 1997; MEAA, 1997; Varley, 1997; Hippocrates, 
1996; Chadwick & Mullaly, 1997; Chadwick, 1996, 1994; Sheridan-Burns, 1996; 
Sheridan-Burns, 1995; Anderson, 1995; Flint, 1995; Rood, 1985; Hurst & White, 1994; 
Turner, 1994; Apps, 1986; Bowman, 1983; Avieson, 1978). Even some of the most 
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recent work, such as Richards (2001), frames journalism ethics in terms of ‘public 
interest, private lives.’  
 
The literature on the ethical use of images, whether on moving or still, also 
reflects the deontological frame (Griffin, 1995; Smith, 1994; Putnis, 1992; Coleman, 
1987; Wischmann, 1987; Brown, 1987; Padgett, 1985). It focuses on conflicts of duty: 
the duty of the photographer or editor to the subject, to the audience, to the publication or 
program, to the profession. Even texts, such as Lester (1991) which canvass a variety of 
ethical frameworks still frame their discussions around duties, rights and responsibilities. 
Other work such as Gross, Katz and Ruby’s Image Ethics: The Moral Rights of Subjects 
in Photographs, Film and Television (1988) is explicitly about rights. The US National 
Press Photographers Association Code speaks strongly of duty Lester, (1991,p.163). 
Griffin (1998), in theorizing photojournalism, writes in an ill-defined fashion of  ‘new 
ethics’ and ‘meta-ethics’ (p.307) by which he appears to mean some notion of journalistic 
social responsibility towards the ‘subjects’ of photojournalism. 
 
Stutchbury, in his defence of the decision to publish the photograph, argued that,  
 
The judgment on where to draw the line in such matters depends on the 
importance of the story and the information in the image. …(I)t was part 
of a genuine effort to accurately portray the reality of the human 
experience, from the joyous to the horrific (Stutchbury 2002, p.2).   
 
‘Yes,’ this argument runs, ‘it might be in bad taste, but we have a higher duty as 
journalists to show you the full horror of the human condition. Day after day, night after 
night’. That journalists have overloaded our sensory system with ‘the horrific’ for the 
ultimate end of pushing circulation and ratings seems to have escaped the proponents of 
this position. 
 
The argument seems on the face of it to be an argument between two competing 
principles: the duty to respect privacy (and the right of individuals to have their privacy 
respected) against what is construed as ‘the public’s right to know’. This second 
‘principle’ is arguably not a principle at all, but a justification for, or a statement of, a 
utilitarian, and thus consequentialist, position: that the greater good is served by the 
invasion of this individual’s privacy. Also implicit in the argument is the self-interested, 
and thus also consequentialist, proposition that voiding of the individual’s right to 
privacy contributes to circulation and ratings. Thus the conflict between the individual’s 
‘right to privacy’ and the public ‘right to know’ is in fact a deontological argument 
against a consequentialist argument, not an argument within a deontological framework. 
 
Stutchbury’s argument, of course, is not a new argument. In a study of the use and 
placement in 57 US and Canadian newspapers of Gregory Marinovich’s 1991 Pulitzer 
Prize winning photographs of the stoning, bludgeoning, stabbing and incineration in 
Soweto of a Zulu man by ANC supporters, Sue O’Brien (1993) found, “a great range of 
ethical theories figured in the editors’ choices”. These ranged from application of 
“proscriptive guidelines such as the traditional ‘breakfast’ and ‘dead body’ tests,” to the 
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argument that, “the pictures offered an invaluable insight into inhumanity that 
outweighed whatever offence to taste they might also carry” (p.71).  The 
consequentialist, outcome-focused, commercial imperatives of competition and 
circulation impinge on, and influence, the editorial decision-making process, but remain 
unacknowledged. So while editors opt for a consequentialist approach, and give lip 
service to deontological frameworks, their readers and critics employ deontology as their 
principal form of moral reasoning. Which brings us to media self-regulation regimes, 
ethics codes and their limits. 
 
Journalists and publications in Australia are subject to several ethical compliance 
regimes. The two major regimes are the Code of Ethics of the journalists’ union, the 
Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance (MEAA), and the Australian Press Council. To 
argue that publication of the Fortuyn photograph was unethical, in terms of either the 
MEAA Code or the Press Council Principles overstates the issue. Publication of the 
photograph does however raise the ethical principle of respect for persons, made explicit 
by Kant in his Categorical Imperative, and carried forward from there into the codes to 
which journalists subscribe to today. So, for example, the Australian journalists’ code is 
preambled by the statement that, “members engaged in journalism commit themselves to 
honesty, fairness, independence and respect for the rights of others,” while Clause 11 of 
the 12 clause code says, “Respect private grief and personal privacy.  Journalists have the 
right to resist compulsion to intrude,” (MEAA 1997,p.122). 
The Australian Press Council is the self-regulatory body of the print media. It was 
established in 1976 with two main aims: to help preserve the traditional freedom of the 
press within Australia and ensure that the free press acts responsibly and ethically. To 
this end, the Council will adjudicate on any complaint made by a reader who feels a 
publication has violated the Council’s principles in a specific instance. The relevant 
clauses of the Press Council’s statement of (ethical) principles are that: 
Clause 3. Readers …are entitled to have news and comment presented to 
them honestly and fairly, and with respect for the privacy and sensibilities 
of individuals. However, the right to privacy should not prevent 
publication of matters of public record or obvious or significant public 
interest.  
Clause 6. A publication has a wide discretion in matters of taste, but this 
does not justify lapses of taste so repugnant as to be extremely offensive to 
its readership.  
Clause 7. Publications should not place any gratuitous emphasis on the 
race, religion, nationality, colour, country of origin, gender, sexual 
orientation, marital status, disability, illness, or age of an individual or 
group. Nevertheless, where it is relevant and in the public interest, 
publications may report and express opinions in these areas (Australian 
Press Council, 1996).  
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These principles tend to be dichotomous. Privacy and sensibility are respected, 
unless there is an overriding public interest, as are ‘gratuitous’ references to matters such 
as sexual orientation. Publications have discretion on taste, so long as any lack of taste is 
not ‘extremely offensive’. There is no guidance as to how taste might be defined, or what 
constitutes bad taste in a pluralistic, secular, democratic society. Implicit in this principle 
is the notion that, ‘we can’t define bad taste, but you know it when you see it’. This is 
also an issue for other media regulatory bodies such as the Australian Advertising 
Standards Bureau, a self-regulatory industry body funded by large advertisers. The 
Australian Association of National Advertisers code provides that (inter alia): 
Advertisements shall not portray people in a way which discriminates 
against or vilifies a person or section of the community on account of race, 
ethnicity, nationality, sex, age, sexual preference, religion, disability or 
political belief. Advertisements shall not present or portray violence unless 
it is justifiable in the context of the product or service advertised 
(Advertising Standards Bureau, 2002). 
Such bodies are left to their own devices to determine what they consider 
community standards to be, and are left reliant on their previous decisions in the form of 
precedents, which is ultimately a form of casuistry, a form of moral reasoning discussed 
in more detail below. As the use of ethics codes in media organisations has proliferated 
over the past decade, there has been an emerging counter-view in the wider field of 
applied ethics that codes are not especially useful instruments for promoting integrity, 
and are in fact regressive instruments of social control (Schwartz, 2000; De Maria, 1999; 
Maguire, 1999; Laufer & Robertson, 1997; Kjonstad & Wilmott, 1995). This counter-
view offers a radical critique of codes and goes much further than the discussion on the 
limits of codes by Black and others (Black, Steele & Barney, 1995; Longstaff, 1994; 
Black, 1985). 
 
While the ethical appropriateness of the photograph is open to debate, the 
reference to Fortuyn’s homosexuality in the headline appears to be a prima facie a breach 
of the Australian journalists’ code which precludes “unnecessary emphasis on personal 
characteristics, including race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, age, sexual orientation, 
family relationships, religious belief, or physical or intellectual disability…” and the 
Australian Press Council Principles which preclude any ” any gratuitous emphasis on the 
…sexual orientation… of an individual or group.”  However, as the Press Council 
principles continue, reportage and comment “where it is relevant and in the public 
interest” is permissible. The headline also clearly breaches Clause 2 of the MEAA Code 
of Ethics, which says: 
 
Do not place unnecessary emphasis on personal characteristics, including 
race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, age, sexual orientation, family 
relationships, religious belief, or physical or intellectual 
disability…(MEAA 1997, p.122). 
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In this case, the reference to Fortuyn’s sexual orientation in the headline is not 
demonstrated to be relevant nor in the public interest in the story below the photograph. 
O’Brien (1993) found that such photos are likely to generate less reader reaction if 
presented “thoughtfully and with context.” The irrelevance of Fortuyn’s sexuality was 
demonstrated by decision to change the headline, a headline which demonstrated little 
context and even less thought. Yet Fortuyn used his sexual orientation as a political 
weapon. His argument against immigration was that Muslims would restrict the civil 
rights of homosexuals, a position which could be characterised as ‘libertarian racism’. 
The day of his death The New York Times (Simons 2002, p.1) reported:  
 
He said he found it shameful that foreign Islamic clergy here (in The 
Netherlands) used offensive language against gays in this country, and that 
Muslim men tried to impose medieval rural customs in the Netherlands. 
"How can you respect a culture if the woman has to walk several steps 
behind her man, has to stay in the kitchen and keep her mouth shut," he 
said.  
 
Missing, of course, in all of this moralising, about publication of the photograph is 
any suggestion that the consent of the subject, or the subject’s family, is necessary in the 
taking and use of the photograph. While family sensitivities are often cited as a reason 
not to use a photograph (Day 1991, p.235), codes are silent on this issue. Some 
photographers are aware of intruding into grief, and simply apply their technology to 
avoid the problem through use of telephoto lenses. The perceptions of press 
photographers and their audiences as to what constitutes ethical conduct differ widely 
(Hartley, 1983; Griffin, 1995). In using the photograph did Stutchbury and his fellow 
editors see Fortuyn as something of a political freak show, albeit one far enough away to 
avoid the censure that often accompanies inappropriate depictions of difference, and 
portrayed him as a curiosity? Given their initial headline describing Fortuyn as a gay, 
anti-Muslim maverick, this is certainly one possible interpretation. 
 
Iconic status: casuistry and case based reasoning 
 
Stutchbury’s final point in defence drew on the argument that such photographs 
had ‘iconic’ status, an argument he expanded on in The Australian the following day: 
 
Newspapers are an essential part of the historical record. Confronting and 
shocking at first, this historical record includes film showing the 
assassination of John F. Kennedy, newspaper front pages showing his 
brother Robert dying from a killer's bullet and iconic photographs of war 
such as a naked Vietnamese girl screaming from the pain of napalm 
(Stutchbury 2002, p.2). 
 
This argument is worthy of further analysis. First, to edit a newspaper with one 
eye towards the role of newspapers as a first draft of history has its risks. Certainly the 
role of handmaiden to the historians was not top of mind for many of Stutchbury’s fellow 
Murdoch editors that day. Surely, as commercial media, their primary role is to sell 
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newspapers, and within that constraint, to report the news accurately and fairly. Secondly, 
is it not the subsequent publication principally by historians, and not newspaper editors, 
which give iconic status to images? It is the repeated re-publication, appropriation and re- 
contexualisation (Edwards & Winkler, p.305) of the classic Associated Press photograph 
by Joe Rosenthal of the raising of Old Glory at Iwo Jima in World War II that makes it 
iconic, not its original publication, at a time when its meaning, while present, was not as 
clearly defined as it subsequently became.  
 
Similarly, with photos of the dead Kennedys. Symbolic of a number of things: the 
end of Camelot, the foreshortening of a promising, fresh, youthful, American political 
dynasty who may have avoided the tragedy of Vietnam, and the cancer of violence in 
American culture, such meanings only became clearer with the passing of time. Likewise, 
Associated Press photographer Huynh Cong (Nick) Ut’s 1972 picture of a naked, nine 
year old Phan Thi Kim Phuc running, screaming with pain from napalm burns, came to 
symbolise much that was wrong with the Vietnam War. Both ‘Iwo Jima’ and ‘Vietnam 
Napalm’ subsequently went on to win the Pulitzer Prize, an award which no doubt 
assisted their transition from powerful image to icon. 
 
Stutchbury’s argument about the photograph’s iconic status is a form of casuistry, 
a mode of moral reasoning with a long history. Casuistry was used by Cicero and the 
Stoics, and was widely used in the medieval Church, but its usage became corrupted and 
it was attacked by the Protestant Reformers, as well Catholic Jansenists such as Blaise 
Pascal. Until recently it was largely discredited as a form of moral reasoning. It has been 
revived, largely in the field of bioethics, through the work of Stephen Toulmin and Albert 
Jonsen (1988) but not without some trenchant criticism (Boyle, 1997; Tomlinson, 1994).  
 
Casuistry seeks to work inductively from cases, (Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988, 
pp.106-107), comparing like with like, whereas deontological moral reasoning is 
deductive. The advantage of using such a method is that people who hold different 
principles can often come to agreement on the solution to a particular problem without 
the necessity to compromise on the principles they hold. However, casuistry is an 
explicitly non-principled form of moral reasoning, and still has some way to go before it 
is rehabilitated as a universally acceptable form of moral reasoning. Boeyink (1992) 
makes a case for the use of casuistry in journalism ethics, but not a convincing one. 
Skating over casuistry’s problematic past in one paragraph (p.112), Boeyink posits 
casuistry as a middle way between a situation ethics which sees each case as unique and 
an ‘absolutism’ in which cases are “the passive raw material to which moral principles 
are applied” (p.111), a sort of systematized situationalism. It would seem that a 
newsroom culture that defined its ethical values on evolving precedents was at greater 
risk of unethical conduct than one based on a shared and agreed set of principles 
(deontology) or on dispositions of character (virtue). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The admixture of moral reasoning in Stutchbury’s defence; the consequentialist 
argument that publication of the photograph was “part of a genuine effort to accurately 
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portray the reality of the human experience,” (Stutchbury 2002, p.2), an outcome to be 
constantly pursued, followed by his deontological argument that newspapers of record 
have a duty to publish such photographs, mixed up with some casuistry about the iconic 
status of the photograph, is not unusual, nor surprising once one recognises Krebs notion 
of ‘real life’ moral reasoning. Stutchbury’s apparently dichotomous defence is an 
example of this. 
 
So while the photograph, on its own, raised questions of taste, which may also be 
construed as questions of ethics, the initial headline certainly did breach current 
Australian ethical standards, or did it? That there was a possible breach of the standards 
was implicitly acknowledged by the newspaper in changing the headline in subsequent 
editions and in low-key approach to the disclosure of the change. The photograph was 
graphic, confronting and distasteful to secure, middle class antipodeans eating breakfast. 
It was of a dead white man in a suit, when The Australian’s readers have been habituated 
over the past decade to only seeing dead African children amid drought, necklaced black 
South Africans, suicided Palestinians, and drowned Middle Eastern asylum seekers. 
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